The field of “science studies” has often been suspected of dubious moral grounds because of its intensive concern with nonhumans; the accusation is made by those who use a roughly Kantian definition of what it is to occupy the moral high ground. By evaluating four contrasting texts (by Comte-Sponville, Kant, Serres, and Lovelock) in tandem, this article explores what an “objective morality” would look like, and it considers how to compare the Kantian axiology with the actor-network theory's possible definition of (...) a thing-oriented morality. Especially important in this context is the moral intensity of a text, which this article defines semiotically in terms of the ability to feel responsible by responding to the “call” of more beings than the human beings so exclusively attended to in the moralist tradition. (shrink)

Stance voluntarism highlights the role of the will in epistemic agency, claiming that agents can control the epistemic stances they assume in forming beliefs. It claims that radical belief changes are not compelled by the evidence; they are rationally permitted choices about which epistemic stances to adopt. However, terms like “will”, “choice”, and “stance” play a crucial role while being left as vague notions. This paper investigates what kind of control rational agents can have over epistemic stances. I argue that (...) whether epistemic stances are voluntary depends on what kind of stance is being assessed. Sometimes epistemic stances are taken to be evaluative attitudes about how to produce knowledge. This kind of stance is not directly controllable, since it is essentially connected to beliefs, and believing is not voluntary. But sometimes epistemic stances are taken to be styles of reasoning and modes of engagement, expressing ways of approaching the world in order to produce knowledge, which can be voluntary. Overall, this supports a formulation of stance voluntarism as a dual-systems theory of epistemic agency, where epistemic rationality is compounded by a dynamic interplay between involuntary processes of belief formation and voluntary processes of cognitive guidance. (shrink)

The problem of unconceived alternatives states that, since scientists have recurrently failed to conceive relevant theoretical alternatives for some domains of science, current scientists are probably also failing to do so. Therefore, there may be theories which still exceed the grasp of scientists’ imagination, and one should not endorse a realist stance towards current science. In this paper, I raise a conceptual worry for the formulation of this problem: what does it mean to say that scientists failed to conceive a (...) relevant theory? What aggravates the problem is that no simple notion of relevance makes the New Induction as strong as it initially seems. I consider the three more obvious interpretations of relevance: relevance as objective probability; relevance as epistemic probability assessed by current scientists; and relevance as epistemic probability assessed by past scientists. I argue that assuming any of these three notions implies difficulties for the New Induction, hence their proponents shouldn’t take the notion of relevance for granted. A more precise definition of relevance is essential to understand what are the difficulties surrounding the problem of unconceived alternatives as an epistemic worry. Until now, such notion is missing. KeyWords: Scientific realism, unconceived alternatives, Kyle Stanford, New Induction, Pessimistic Induction. (shrink)

Arthur Fine presented the Natural Ontological Attitude as a third alternative between scientific realism and anti-realism by identifying a core position contained in both and rejecting any philosophical addition to this core. At first, Fine’s proposal was understood as offering a doxastic middle ground between believing in the truth of a theory and believing in its empirical adequacy. In this reading, NOA was widely disregarded after Alan Musgrave’s criticisms of it, which characterized Fine’s proposal as a form of realism. After (...) that, NOA was reinterpreted as a local variety of realism focused in changing the attitude used to settle the scientific realism debate, by rejecting global philosophies with an approach external to science, and by considering only the scientific evidence with a contextualist mood. Although this reading clarifies how to understand NOA, there is still no consensus about what is Fine’s argument to support it. I organize the four main interpretations of Fine’s defense and point their main flaws. Finally, I develop some clarifications about NOA in order to solve the flaws of the preceding interpretations, defending that NOA is based upon a prevalence of the epistemic values actually used in scientific practice. (shrink)

ResumoO argumento do milagre afirma que o realismo científico é a melhor explicação para o sucesso da ciência:teorias científicas são bem-sucedidas porque são verdadeiras, e cientistas são bem-sucedidos em encontrarteorias verdadeiras porque se baseiam em normas metodológicas confiáveis. A tese da incomensurabilidademetodológica afirma que teorias científicas não são escolhidas através de um algoritmo neutro de normas epistêmicas. Isso revela uma lacuna na explicação realista: normas epistêmicas confiáveis não são suficientes para conduzir a escolhas de teorias verdadeiras, pois tais escolhas também (...) são determinadas por outros fatores além de normas epistêmicas. A introdução de fatores adicionais como subdeterminando a escolha de teorias engendrou argumentos relativistas e antirrealistas contra o realismo. A explicação realista pode ser reabilitada se postular que os cientistas possuem autoridade epistêmica para aprimorar as normas metodológicas da ciência, sendo aptos a tomar decisões autônomas em vez de regidas por regras.AbstractThe no miracles argument claims that scientific realism is the best explanation to science’s success: scientifictheories are empirically successful because they are truthlike, and scientists are successful in theory-choices because they rely on reliable methodological norms. The methodological incommensurability thesis claims that there is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice. It reveals a gap in the realist explanation: reliable epistemic norms are not sufficient to guarantee successful theory-choices, because theory- choices are also determined by other factors besides epistemic norms. The introduction of additional factors as underdetermining theory-choices motivates relativist and antirealist positions. But the realist explanation can be rehabilitated if it postulates that scientists have epistemic authority to develop methodological norms, being apt to take decisions which are autonomous rather than rule-driven. (shrink)

Ensemble musicians play in synchrony despite expressively motivated irregularities in timing. We hypothesized that synchrony is achieved by each performer internally simulating the concurrent actions of other ensemble members, relying initially on how they would perform in their stead. Hence, musicians should be better at synchronizing with recordings of their own earlier performances than with others’ recordings. We required pianists to record one part from each of several piano duets, and later to play the complementary part in synchrony with their (...) own or others’ recordings. The pianists were also asked to identify their own recordings. The pianists were better at synchronizing with their own than with others’ performances, and they were able to recognize their own recordings. Furthermore, synchronization accuracy and recognition were correlated: Pianists who were relatively accurate at synchronizing with their own performances were also good at recognizing them. Thus, action simulation may underlie both synchronization and self-recognition. (shrink)

Pain, suffering and positive emotions in patients in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) and minimally conscious states (MCS) pose clinical and ethical challenges. Clinically, we evaluate behavioural responses after painful stimulation and also emotionally-contingent behaviours (e.g., smiling). Using stimuli with emotional valence, neuroimaging and electrophysiology technologies can detect subclinical remnants of preserved capacities for pain which might influence decisions about treatment limitation. To date, no data exist as to how healthcare providers think about end-of-life options (e.g., withdrawal of artificial nutrition (...) and hydration) in the presence or absence of pain in non-communicative patients. Here, we aimed to better clarify this issue by re-analyzing previously published data on pain perception (Prog Brain Res 2009 177, 329–38) and end-of-life decisions (J Neurol 2010 258, 1058–65) in patients with disorders of consciousness. In a sample of 2259 European healthcare professionals we found that, for VS/UWS more respondents agreed with treatment withdrawal when they considered that VS/UWS patients did not feel pain (77%) as compared to those who thought VS/UWS did feel pain (59%). This interaction was influenced by religiosity and professional background. For MCS, end-of-life attitudes were not influenced by opinions on pain perception. Within a contemporary ethical context we discuss (1) the evolving scientific understandings of pain perception and their relationship to existing clinical and ethical guidelines; (2) the discrepancies of attitudes within (and between) healthcare providers and their consequences for treatment approaches, and (3) the implicit but complex relationship between pain perception and attitudes toward life-sustaining treatments. (shrink)

The INBIOSA project brings together a group of experts across many disciplines who believe that science requires a revolutionary transformative step in order to address many of the vexing challenges presented by the world. It is INBIOSA’s purpose to enable the focused collaboration of an interdisciplinary community of original thinkers. This paper sets out the case for support for this effort. The focus of the transformative research program proposal is biology-centric. We admit that biology to date has been more fact-oriented (...) and less theoretical than physics. However, the key leverageable idea is that careful extension of the science of living systems can be more effectively applied to some of our most vexing modern problems than the prevailing scheme, derived from abstractions in physics. While these have some universal application and demonstrate computational advantages, they are not theoretically mandated for the living. A new set of mathematical abstractions derived from biology can now be similarly extended. This is made possible by leveraging new formal tools to understand abstraction and enable computability. [The latter has a much expanded meaning in our context from the one known and used in computer science and biology today, that is "by rote algorithmic means", since it is not known if a living system is computable in this sense (Mossio et al., 2009).] Two major challenges constitute the effort. The first challenge is to design an original general system of abstractions within the biological domain. The initial issue is descriptive leading to the explanatory. There has not yet been a serious formal examination of the abstractions of the biological domain. What is used today is an amalgam; much is inherited from physics (via the bridging abstractions of chemistry) and there are many new abstractions from advances in mathematics (incentivized by the need for more capable computational analyses). Interspersed are abstractions, concepts and underlying assumptions “native” to biology and distinct from the mechanical language of physics and computation as we know them. A pressing agenda should be to single out the most concrete and at the same time the most fundamental process-units in biology and to recruit them into the descriptive domain. Therefore, the first challenge is to build a coherent formal system of abstractions and operations that is truly native to living systems. Nothing will be thrown away, but many common methods will be philosophically recast, just as in physics relativity subsumed and reinterpreted Newtonian mechanics. -/- This step is required because we need a comprehensible, formal system to apply in many domains. Emphasis should be placed on the distinction between multi-perspective analysis and synthesis and on what could be the basic terms or tools needed. The second challenge is relatively simple: the actual application of this set of biology-centric ways and means to cross-disciplinary problems. In its early stages, this will seem to be a “new science”. This White Paper sets out the case of continuing support of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for transformative research in biology and information processing centered on paradigm changes in the epistemological, ontological, mathematical and computational bases of the science of living systems. Today, curiously, living systems cannot be said to be anything more than dissipative structures organized internally by genetic information. There is not anything substantially different from abiotic systems other than the empirical nature of their robustness. We believe that there are other new and unique properties and patterns comprehensible at this bio-logical level. The report lays out a fundamental set of approaches to articulate these properties and patterns, and is composed as follows. -/- Sections 1 through 4 (preamble, introduction, motivation and major biomathematical problems) are incipient. Section 5 describes the issues affecting Integral Biomathics and Section 6 -- the aspects of the Grand Challenge we face with this project. Section 7 contemplates the effort to formalize a General Theory of Living Systems (GTLS) from what we have today. The goal is to have a formal system, equivalent to that which exists in the physics community. Here we define how to perceive the role of time in biology. Section 8 describes the initial efforts to apply this general theory of living systems in many domains, with special emphasis on crossdisciplinary problems and multiple domains spanning both “hard” and “soft” sciences. The expected result is a coherent collection of integrated mathematical techniques. Section 9 discusses the first two test cases, project proposals, of our approach. They are designed to demonstrate the ability of our approach to address “wicked problems” which span across physics, chemistry, biology, societies and societal dynamics. The solutions require integrated measurable results at multiple levels known as “grand challenges” to existing methods. Finally, Section 10 adheres to an appeal for action, advocating the necessity for further long-term support of the INBIOSA program. -/- The report is concluded with preliminary non-exclusive list of challenging research themes to address, as well as required administrative actions. The efforts described in the ten sections of this White Paper will proceed concurrently. Collectively, they describe a program that can be managed and measured as it progresses. (shrink)

Serious actualism is the prima facie plausible thesis that things couldn’t have been related while being nothing. The thesis plays an important role in a number of arguments in metaphysics, e.g., in Plantinga’s argument for the claim that propositions do not ontologically depend on the things that they are about and in Williamson’s argument for the claim that he, Williamson, is necessarily something. Salmon has put forward that which is, arguably, the most pressing challenge to serious actualists. Salmon’s objection is (...) based on a scenario intended to elicit the judgment that merely possible entities may nonetheless be actually referred to, and so may actually have properties. It is shown that predicativism, the thesis that names are true of their bearers, provides the resources for replying to Salmon’s objection. In addition, an argument for serious actualism based on Stephanou, 219–250 2007) is offered. Finally, it is shown that once serious actualism is conjoined with some minimal assumptions, it implies property necessitism, the thesis that necessarily all properties are necessarily something, as well as a strong comprehension principle for higher-order modal logic according to which for every condition there necessarily is the property of being a thing satisfying that condition. (shrink)

Necessitism, Contingentism, and Theory Equivalence is a dissertation on issues in higher-order modal metaphysics. Consider a modal higher-order language with identity in which the universal quantifier is interpreted as expressing universal quantification and the necessity operator is interpreted as expressing metaphysical necessity. The main question addressed in the dissertation concerns the correct theory formulated in this language. A different question that also takes centre stage in the dissertation is what it takes for theories to be equivalent.The whole dissertation consists of (...) an extended argument in defence of the truth of two seemingly inconsistent higher-order modal theories, specifically: 1.Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a theory based on Plantinga’s [1] modal metaphysics that is committed to, among other things, the contingent being of some individuals and the necessary being of all possible higher-order entities;2.Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a theory advocated by Williamson [3] which is committed to, among other things, the necessary being of every possible individual as well as of every possible higher-order entity.Part of the case for these theories’ joint truth relies on defences of the following metaphysical theses: Thorough Serious Actualism, the thesis that no things could have been related while being nothing, and Higher-Order Necessitism, the thesis that necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories. The defence of Higher-Order Necessitism constitutes a powerful challenge to Stalnaker’s [2] Thorough Contingentism, a theory committed to, among other things, the view that there could have been some individuals as well as some entities of any higher-order that could have been nothing.In the dissertation it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are in fact equivalent, even if they appear to be jointly inconsistent. The case for this claim relies on the Synonymy account, a novel account of theory equivalence developed and defended in the dissertation. According to this account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same commitments and conception of logical space.By way of defending the Synonymy account’s adequacy, the account is applied to the debate between noneists, proponents of the view that some things do not exist, and Quineans, proponents of the view that to exist just is to be some thing. The Synonymy account is shown to afford a more nuanced and better understanding of that debate by revealing that what noneists and Quineans are really disagreeing about is what expressive resources are available to appropriately describe the world.By coupling a metatheoretical result with tools from the philosophy of language, it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are synonymous theories, and so, by the lights of the Synonymy account, equivalent. Given the defence of their extant commitments made in the dissertation, it is concluded that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are both correct. A corollary of this result is that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is, in an important sense, merely verbal. For if two theories are equivalent, then they “require the same of the world for their truth.”Thus, the results of the dissertation reveal that if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, then one will not go wrong. Notwithstanding, one will still go wrong if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism.On the basis of a conception of the individual constants and predicates of second-order modal languages as strongly Millian, i.e., as having actually existing entities as their semantic values, in the appendix are presented second-order modal logics consistent with Stalnaker’s Thorough Contingentism. Furthermore, it is shown there that these logics are strong enough for applications of higher-order modal logic in mathematics, a result that constitutes a reply to an argument to the contrary by Williamson [3]. Finally, these logics are proven to be complete relative to particular “thoroughly contingentist” classes of models. (shrink)

This paper analyses Giordano Bruno's dialogue De l’infinito universo e mondi (The Infinite Universe and Worlds), written during his stay in England (1583–85), in the context of his philosophical works and, particularly, within the context of scientific and imaginative writings such as Cyrano de Bergerac's Other Worlds (published posthumously in 1662) and Francis Godwin's The Man in the Moone (1638). The article also discusses the contemporary speculations of Galileo and Kepler regarding the existence of a plurality of worlds and (...) the presence of creatures on the moon and their rapport with humans. Besides the imaginative, fantastic and pseudoscientific elements, attention is also given to religious implications and attitudes, especially in the case of Godwin, who, like his countryman John Wilkins—author of The Discovery of the Worlde in the Moone (1638)–was a bishop and therefore wanted to avoid any controversy with the church. (shrink)

The topic of liberty in Foucault becomes controversial when related to the objections, predicted by the author, for the subjects to be located outside the power networks. However, Foucault also points out potential for resistance and a notion of freedom involved by historical circumstances, which suggests original normative questions. In order to analyze the tension between domination and freedom in his work, and what is normatively reflected, two main directions are noted: the idea of freedom as something inherent in power (...) relations and as the foundation of the critical exercise of knowledge. It is argued that Foucault`s estimation of dimensions of freedom generates singular implications of evaluation of social conditions based on a normative temperance. (shrink)

Despite a large and multifaceted effort to understand the vast landscape of phenotypic data, their current form inhibits productive data analysis. The lack of a community-wide, consensus-based, human- and machine-interpretable language for describing phenotypes and their genomic and environmental contexts is perhaps the most pressing scientific bottleneck to integration across many key fields in biology, including genomics, systems biology, development, medicine, evolution, ecology, and systematics. Here we survey the current phenomics landscape, including data resources and handling, and the progress that (...) has been made to accurately capture relevant data descriptions for phenotypes. We present an example of the kind of integration across domains that computable phenotypes would enable, and we call upon the broader biology community, publishers, and relevant funding agencies to support efforts to surmount today's data barriers and facilitate analytical reproducibility. (shrink)

Resumo: Este estudo objetiva retomar o diálogo efetuado entre a tradição da ontologia hermenêutica heideggeriana e a psicanálise freudiana, a fim de discutir se ele ainda tem lugar na atualidade e, em caso positivo, problematizar como ele tem sido construído. Apesar de existirem muitos argumentos que questionam a possibilidade de articulação entre esses dois campos, eles não encerram consensualmente essa discussão e exigem ser atualizados. No cenário mais recente, algumas pesquisas têm acenado para o estabelecimento de pontos de conexões entre (...) elas, sem, contudo, desconsiderarem a especificidade dos campos teóricos em questão. Essa forma de interlocução parece o grande desafio aos pesquisadores na atualidade.: This study aims to retake the dialogue made between the tradition of the heideggerian hermeneutic ontology and freudian psychoanalysis, in order to discuss whether it still has a place in the actuality and, if so, to problematize how it has been constructed. Despite having a lot of arguments which question the possibility of articulation between both fields, they don't enclose consensually this debate and require an updating. In the last scenario, some researches go towards the establishment of connection points among them, without, however, disregarding the specificity of the theoretical fields in question. This way of interlocution seems the great challenge of the researchers nowadays. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to argue that all—or almost all—logical rules have exceptions. In particular, it is argued that this is a moral that we should draw from the semantic paradoxes. The idea that we should respond to the paradoxes by revising logic in some way is familiar. But previous proposals advocate the replacement of classical logic with some alternative logic. That is, some alternative system of rules, where it is taken for granted that these hold without exception. (...) The present proposal is quite different. According to this, there is no such alternative logic. Rather, classical logic retains the status of the ‘one true logic’, but this status must be reconceived so as to be compatible with (almost) all of its rules admitting of exceptions. This would seem to have significant repercussions for a range of widely held views about logic: e.g. that it is a priori, or that it is necessary. Indeed, if the arguments of the paper succeed, then such views must be given up. (shrink)

Les lectures traditionnelles de l'oeuvre de Max Scheler en font un « moraliste » et envisagent son projet phénoménologique comme moyen pour formaliser son éthique. On tente ici, au contraire, l'expérience d'une lecture de l'a priori objectif schelerien et de son matérialisme axiologique du seul point de vue de la démarche phénoménologique, nécessaire pour comprendre ses critiques du rationalisme kantien et l'originalité de sa philosophie « affective ». Sa postérité française offre des outils pour extraire la teneur phénoménologique de cette (...) oeuvre et lui permettre de tenir ses promesses. Elle permet aussi de découvrir les difficultés de cette lecture de Scheler : si sa philosophie est avant tout une phénoménologie, comment qualifier le pôle subjectif du rapport intentionnel qui nous ouvre au sens a priori des objets du monde, c'est-à-dire à leurs « valeurs »? Et si la teneur axiologique des objets précède effectivement ce rapport, comment répondre à la question phénoménologique de la constitution des valeurs? Traditional approaches of Max Scheler's work turn him into a moralist and consider his phenomenological project as a means to formalize ethics. But it is possible to read his objective a priori and his axiological materialism from the only point of view of his phenomenological attempt, necessary as it was to understand his criticism of kantian rationalism and the originality of his emotional philosophy. His French posterity offers tools to extract the phenomenological element in his work, thus enabling to keep his promises. It also enables one to discover the difficulties at stake of such an approach of Scheler : if his philosophy is first and foremost a phenomenology, how may one define the subjective pole as différent form the intentional relationship introducing us to the a priori meaning of the objects in the world, i.e. their « values »? And if the axiological import of the objects indeed cornes before such as relationship, how may one reply to the phenomenological topic of how values are erected? (shrink)

This paper endeavors to carry out a philosophical analysis of the current state of civic education in Western democracies, in order to deal with the problematic dualism between extreme individualism and endogamic communitarianism, which alters the relational modalities and specific lifestyles that characterize human plurality. As such, the intention of this article is to understand how the formation of citizens supported by the practice of philosophy can cultivate a dialogical, open, and pluralistic community capable of facing this duality. For this (...) purpose, we carried out a systematic and critical analysis of books and articles that, in dealing with the relationship between the individual and the community, aim to overcome the above-mentioned problematic dualism. Among the results of this study, we found that Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp’s Philosophy for Children (P4C) program contributes significantly to the empowerment of citizens, and supports the development of their ability to engage in dialogue in search of creative and ethical solutions in the diverse circumstances of daily life. Moreover, P4C contributes to the achievement of communities characterised by solidarity, plurality, openness, and self-correction, and which are oriented toward the rigorous search for the common good. Therefore, we conclude that community-based philosophical practices such as P4C can contribute to civic education and the formation of responsible citizens, offering a possible paradigm to develop the humanistic axis of the individual and promote openness to diversity. (shrink)

Game theory is the systematic study of interdependent rational choice. It should be distinguished from decision theory, the systematic study of individual (practical and epistemic) choice in parametric contexts (i.e., where the agent is choosing or deliberating independently of other agents). Decision theory has several applications to ethics (see Dreier 2004; Mele and Rawlings 2004). Game theory may be used to explain, to predict, and to evaluate human behavior in contexts where the outcome of action depends on what several agents (...) choose to do and where their choices depend on what others choose to do. (See the entry on game theory) Game theory consequently is relevant to ethics, and it is used in moral and political philosophy in a variety of ways. We shall concentrate on the influence and use of game theory in ethics and those parts of political theory involving norms or principles of justice, ignoring questions about political and legal institutions on the one hand and questions about issues dealing with moral virtues on the other. (shrink)

In this paper, my aim is to reconstruct, through the material presented in the handschrifter Nachlaß, Kant`s criticism to Hutcheson and to the doctrine of moral feeling in the 1770s in the so called silent decade. As we can note, this criticism generally is addressed to the fact that the doctrine of moral feeling is lacking an objective ground on which can be established a categorical conception of ethics. Moreover, I argue that in this context Kant already demonstrates, from his (...) critical position in the Reflexionen and Vorlesungen, the general lines of his mature conception on moral feeling as something strictly linked to our awareness of the law. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to discuss Lacan’s phrase in the title so as to show not only that the reality of the unconscious is problematic and requires an ethical approach but also that such an approach is recommended to psychoanalytical practice in general. Psychoanalysis would then be conceived as an ethics of the real – of the encounter with the traumatic, the critical or or the unassimilable.

The Italian «constitutional compromise» between the liberal, catholic, and socialist-communist traditions and the «fordist-keynesian compromise» between capital and labor are two frequent set expressions. They are often put together, and sometimes overlapped, insofar as they share an emphasis on the central role of labor, the former putting it at the very foundation of the Republic, the latter at the core of the virtuous circle of mass production and mass consumption. Starting from a discussion of these formulas, the essay will propose (...) some lines of research for the history of the Italian Republic, not without significance for contemporary political discourse. (shrink)

Plausibly, mathematical claims are true, but the fundamental furniture of the world does not include mathematical objects. This can be made sense of by providing mathematical claims with paraphrases, which make clear how the truth of such claims does not require the fundamental existence of mathematical objects. This paper explores the consequences of this type of position for explanatory structure. There is an apparently straightforward relationship between this sort of structure, and the logical sort: i.e. logically complex claims are explained (...) by logically simpler ones. For example, disjunctions are explained by their (true) disjuncts, while generalizations are explained by their (true) instances. This would seem as plausible in the case of mathematics as elsewhere. Also, it would seem to be something that the anti-realist approaches at issue would want to preserve. It will be argued, however, that these approaches cannot do this: they lead not merely to violations of the familiar principles relating logical and explanatory structure, but even to reversals of these. That is, there are cases where generalizations explain their instances, or disjunctions their disjuncts. (shrink)

The extent of the originality and relevance of Kant's ethics is undeniable. But it is not so evident the fact that the Kant's moral philosophy as a whole was not suddenly built, but it was dependent on a profound debate with the philosophical tradition, especially with the German scholastic tradition, a debate which led to the assimilation or appropriation of several of its aspects. With special regard to the history of the development of the categorical imperative, it is not possible (...) to be indifferent to the influence of the practical philosophy of the Enlightenment German philosopher and theologian, Christian August Crusius. The aim of this article is thus to try to identify, taking into account the distinction of praxis in problematic and moral and the contrast between prudence and morality, some points of intersection between the moral philosophy of Crusius and Kant in its origin. (shrink)

Against a hermeneutic reading of deconstruction, this essay attempts to prove how, on the contrary, Derrida’s thought opposes itself to the primacy of interpretation. In these terms it revalues Nietzsche’s thesis, according to which there are only interpretations and no facts, and Derrida’s one about nothing existing out of the text, just because this essay reads them as the specific ways both the philosophers use in their attempt to deny the existence of a single interpretation to act as a canon, (...) and to reaffirm text’s independence from any attempt of metaphysical closure. (shrink)

In recent decades, there has been widespread debate in the human and social sciences regarding the compatibility and the relative merits of quantitative and qualitative approaches in research. In psychiatry, depending on disciplines and traditions, objects of study can be represented either in words or using two types of mathematization. In the latter case, the use of mathematics in psychiatry is most often only local, as opposed to global as in the case of classical mechanics. Relationships between these objects of (...) study can in turn be explored in three different ways: 1/ by a hermeneutic process, 2/ using statistics, the most frequent method in psychiatric research today, 3/ using equations, i.e. using mathematical relationships that are formal and deterministic. The 3 ways of representing entities (with language, locally with mathematics or globally with mathematics) and the 3 ways of expressing the relationships between entities (using hermeneutics, statistics or equations) can be combined in a cross-tabulation, and nearly all nine combinations can be described using examples. A typology of this nature may be useful in assessing which epistemological perspectives are currently dominant in a constantly evolving field such as psychiatry, and which other perspectives still need to be developed. It also contributes to undermining the overly simplistic and counterproductive beliefs that accompany the assumption of a Manichean “quantitative/qualitative” dichotomy. Systematic examination of this set of typologies could be useful in indicating new directions for future research beyond the quantitative/qualitative divide. (shrink)

The article On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy was published in 1791 on the pages of the monthly periodical berlinische Monatsschrift. By itself, the title of the article already seems to us quite enlightening. What would it be but a criticism of every attempt to justify the God's cause? Nevertheless, there are evidences that there is much more at stake. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to raise the question about the true meaning of the Kant`s (...) text, arguing in favor of the fact that, for some reasons, the essay should not be interpreted exclusively as a criticism, but otherwise as a effort to establish a positive foundation of theodicy. If, indeed, the limits of reason prohibit any attempt to defend the good cause of God by speculative means, on the other hand, practical reason opens the way, throught of the concept of a "authentic theodicy", to answer the objections which the experience raises against the government and justice of God. My purpose, from this, is to stress the important role of theodicy in the system of reason of Kantian philosophy. (shrink)

Depuis l'entrée dans l'âge moderne de l'émancipation, c'est-à-dire depuis l'époque des Lumières et de la Révolution française, on admet en général que les juifs ont brisé un carcan qui les confinait dans des communautés fermées pour participer à la modernité européenne sans se renier et tout en restant juifs. Comment ce cheminement a-t-il eu lieu? Qu'a-t-il réellement impliqué, à la fois pour les juifs et pour les sociétés auxquelles ils s'intégraient? Bruno Karsenti reprend le fil de ce récit. Sous (...) l'angle philosophique, il examine les opérations intellectuelles par lesquelles certaines figures d'exception écrivain (Heine), sociologue (Durkheim), historiens (Salvador, Bloch), philosophe (Strauss) et linguiste (Benveniste) sont entrées dans cette modernité, au prix de quelles tensions et de quels efforts : comment ces hommes ont-ils pensé les liens entre judaïsme et modernité, et comment par là ont-ils éclairé les principes des sociétés démocratiques qui sont aujourd'hui les nôtres? À l'heure où les juifs d'Europe sont inquiets de leur avenir jusqu'à être parfois poussés au départ, à l'heure aussi où théologie et politique, loin de régler leurs rapports, se conjuguent en menace pour les démocraties elles-mêmes, ce livre cherche à redonner tout son sens à l'émancipation sociale et politique qui est notre héritage."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

A conversão forçada dos judeus de Portugal em 1497 repercutiu de forma durável sobre toda a sociedade portuguesa da época moderna, funcionando como uma interferência, um elemento a mais, na complexa rede de distinções sociais da organização estamental da população de então, dado também válido para o ultramar português. Surge, neste contexto, uma vasta literatura de polêmica antijudaica e anti-semita. Para além de estudar a circulação dessas obras, veremos aqui como a mensagem que elas veiculavam se refletiu em textos lidos (...) ou produzidos localmente no Brasil colônia. (shrink)

In order to address social and ecological crises that business-as-usual practices have contributed to, we will need firms that emphasise Universal care (e.g., who place greater commitment on the well-being of the larger community versus on the firm itself) and Benefaction (e.g., who treat stakeholders with dignity and generosity rather than seeing them as means to instrumental financial ends). This study examines two kinds of family firms that have been identified as exhibiting Universal care and Benefaction, which are two components (...) of the social emotional wealth (SEW) family firms are thought to be more likely to emphasize than business-as-usual firms. In particular, we compare Stewardship family firms and Universal family firms, and find support for the proposition from the literature that Universal firms place greater emphasis on Universal care and Benefaction. Implications are discussed. (shrink)

Charles E. Osgood's theory of affective meaning defines affect as interplay of three meaning dimensions – evaluation, potency, and activity – that represent the central constituents of our affective ecology. Based on a rigorous Brunswikian sampling procedure, we selected a representative set of stimuli that mirror this ecology. A germane informative analysis explicates and corroborates the sampling approach. We then report two experiments testing whether these dimensions of affective meaning can be learnt by means of stimulus pairing and stimulus exposure. (...) Our findings yield evidence for (1) stimulus pairing effects on evaluation and activity, and (2) stimulus exposure effects on potency and activity. Overall, the findings reveal that stimulus pairing and stimulus exposure differentially influence the learning of dimensions of affective meaning. We discuss implications of this research for current emotion theories as well as its contribution to research in the cognition–emotion interface. Finally, we argue that the implementation of representative design by virtue of Brunswikian sampling promotes theory development and opens new research avenues for an original and creative science of cognition and emotion. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The present article aims at setting the issue of the relationship between Buddhism and science in a historical and philosophical frame wider than that one taken into account by the international scholarship so far. The historical point of view allows us to conclude that the narrative that connects Buddhism with science is not based on features intrinsic to Buddhist thought. In fact, such narrative prospered thanks to the development of a dialectic, typical of the 18th and 19th centuries, between (...) science and religion. The philosophical point of view allows us to conclude that such narrative is backed by a metaphysical-like thought that denies the specificity of both science and Buddhism. RESUMO O presente artigo pretende enquadrar a questão do relacionamento entre budismo e ciência num âmbito histórico e filosófico mais amplo do que foi levado em consideração até agora pela scholarship internacional. A perspectiva histórica permite concluir que a narrativa que liga budismo e ciência não é baseada em características intrínsecas ao pensamento budista, mas floresceu em dependência do desenvolvimento da dialética religião-ciência dos séculos XVIII e XIX. A perspectiva filosófica, em contrapartida, permite concluir que essa mesma narrativa é sustentada por um pensamento de cunho metafísico e cientista, que nega a especificidade tanto da ciência quanto do budismo. (shrink)